A Ukrainian soldier in the city of Irpin, which was shelled by the Russian army in the first days of the war (CC Kutsenko Volodymyr/Shutterstock)
The war in Ukraine, which Putin continues to call a “special military operation,” has become one of the most incomparable events of the 21st century, not only because of the conflict itself, which has proven higher both in intensity and numbers of victims than the conflicts in what was formerly Yugoslavia, but because of the repercussions and consequences it has for Europe and the world. One year after Russian troops invaded Ukraine, the countries seem doomed to permanent confrontation, far beyond and deeper than their attacks on one another.
The war is starting to resemble Cold War-era conflicts, a period that was believed to be over after the fall of Europe’s communist regimes. There are two nuclear powers facing each other in this scenario: Russia, acting directly, as the Americans did in Korea and Vietnam, and the United States, seconded by its NATO allies, acting indirectly through Ukraine.
The war that brought what was history back
The old post-Cold War hope to integrate Russia into a European security system has completely vanished. The Russians have opted for strategic solitude in the name of heightened nationalism and nostalgia for an imperial past dating back to Czarism and the Soviet era. In Russia, historical comparisons weigh heavily: Yeltsin’s era was likened to the “time of troubles” at the beginning of the 17th century, during which the tsarist power was weakened until the arrival of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. In the 18th century, Palace power struggles also compromised the stability of the monarchy, although they were soon overcome by an iron fist authority similar to that of Peter the Great or Catherine II. And today, Vladimir Putin has put himself forward as the embodiment of the country’s providential ruler who will restore Russia to its past splendor after the aggressions and humiliation from internal and external foes.
The invasion on continental soil has recreated episodes which harken back to World War II, bringing with it winds of change
In this historicist context, in which tradition, orthodox religion and political power come together as a common front, considerations about a democratic Russia or the country’s incorporation into a global economy are not taken into account by those who only value power inside and outside the country’s borders. Such approaches have created a chasm between the liberal West, which until now was mitigated by economic interests, especially those of the Europeans. The invasion of Ukraine, which Europe seemed reluctant to believe until it exploded in all its rawness, has brought with it winds of change. The invasion on continental soil has recreated episodes which harken back to the World War II.
The risks of nuclear weapons
One of the similarities with the Cold War is that one of the actors, Russia, is the largest nuclear power in the world (with more than 6,000 nuclear warheads) and continuously insinuates that it can use this type of weapon if its security or territories are threatened. This approach seems to be based on the fact that the nuclear bombs dropped by the Americans on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945 had the immediate effect of leading Japan to surrender a few days later. The somewhat simplistic conclusion would be that nuclear weapons, provided they are used in a limited way, could serve to defeat an enemy in a war that would stop fighting out of fear of more retaliation of this kind.
Beyond the unrealistic belief that one can limit the effects of a nuclear attack, even with tactical weapons and in a carefully chosen scenario, history shows us that a nuclear power can be defeated, or simply must retreat, in a conventional war. In the Korean conflict, General Douglas MacArthur contemplated using nuclear weapons against China, as Chinese military aid to the North Koreans had forced the Americans to back down. The general’s pride would lead him to say years later that “there is no substitute for victory,” but President Truman removed him from office, preferring a stagnant front to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets, who were already in possession of the bomb since 1949.
Nor did the United States consider using nuclear weapons against the South Vietnamese guerrillas. Rather, it destroyed the jungle with conventional weapons to fight them. The Soviets opted against nuclear means to fight the Islamist guerrillas after the invasion of Afghanistan as well. It is one thing to have nuclear weapons and another to use them. The world has not forgotten what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor will it forget the first-time nuclear weapons were used in conventional warfare. Furthermore, neither Russian territory would be spared from radioactive contamination nor would the Ukrainians lay down their arms in a war that has long since become a struggle for their independence and national sovereignty.
The unforeseeable risks of the use of nuclear weapons will likely lead to the prolongation of the conflict in Ukraine and its eventual stagnation
Russia’s recent suspension of its participation in the START treaty (Strategic Offensive Weapons Treaty), announced by Putin for clear political effect after his contentious speech on February 21, does not come as a surprise. The measure is a strong retort to Western interference in the war in Ukraine, although it was expected as Russia has been withdrawing from all its arms treaties signed with the West. Nothing else could be expected from the country’s continuous assertion of itself as a nationalist and sovereigntist nation, even if the conflict in Ukraine had not occurred.
But what was stated above is true here as well: the deployment of nuclear weapons is always used as a deterrent. Yet, what if deterrence doesn’t work, and the enemy is still engages in conventional warfare? So its use, even in a limited way, has more drawbacks than advantages, as it would surely lead to a similar nuclear response or other devastating conventional measures from the affected nation.
What is Russia without Ukraine?
Consequently, the unforeseeable risks of the use of nuclear weapons mean the conflict in Ukraine is likely to prolong and stagnate over time, becoming yet another of the conflicts in the former Soviet territory which have been described as “frozen conflicts”: Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh… However, this deadlock has a much greater scope than those conflicts. It could even give way to a new border between Russia and Europe, since a Ukraine that would not remain under Russian control would definitively turn its back on what has come to be called the “Russian world,” despite the fact that the history of Ukraine is linked to the origins of medieval Russia.
This potential border could be similar to that of the two Koreas, or even to that of Kashmir, which India and Pakistan have disputed for more than seven decades. Perhaps, much to the detriment of Russian interests, the Ukraine of tomorrow will be taken into the fold of the European sphere of influence, making it the “new South Korea,” with exceptional economic and social development despite the Achilles heel of corruption. And Russia, like North Korea, would be closed in on itself. Which is why Russia has tried to turn Ukraine, with its “special military operation”, into a satellite all to itself.
Ukraine could end up divided like the two Koreas, with part of the country under Russian control and the other pro-Western
What Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s security adviser, said a quarter of a century ago has been fulfilled: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.” For this reason, the outcome of the war will never be completely satisfactory for Russia, even in the unlikely event that it seizes two-thirds of Ukrainian territory and reduces Ukraine’s sovereignty to its western region, which once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland. That remainder of Ukraine would continue to escape Russian influence and persist in its efforts to join Europe, a Europe much more prosperous and attractive, despite its many internal difficulties, than the Russian Federation as a whole.
The possibility of Ukraine slipping out of his hands, coupled with an obsessive determination to go down in history as the country’s restorer of its national and imperial past, led Putin to embark on a conflict that has been anything but the “lightning war” he predicted. His recent addresses insist again and again on the importance of separating the Ukrainian people from their leaders, likening them to the Nazis, which serves as a means for Putin to unfurl the banner of the “great patriotic war” of 1941-45, like he did in his commemoration speech of the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Stalingrad (today Volgograd). The Russian president condemned “the Ukrainian elite and the Ukrainian government, which do not serve the national interest but the governments of other countries” as responsible for the current situation.
We might deduce from this that the Ukrainian national interest cannot be separated from the interest of Russia, and that is why Putin, paradoxically, accuses the “Kiev regime” of occupying Ukraine economically and politically. Therefore, his “special military operation” would amount to a “liberation” war, a war into which Russia was simply dragged into against its will, despite its attempts to mediate in Donbas after the 2014 clashes. In this sense, it is significant that Russia, in international forums, has exerted, as the United States or Israel have done on different occasions, art. 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes the inherent right to legitimate defense.
A cultural crusade
On the other hand, Putin not only poses the conflict as one of liberation but also as a defense of Russian cultural values, closely connected to an orthodox religion historically linked to a centralized power. A Ukraine under Western influence supposes a loss not only of political scope, but even moral. According to the Russian leader, the party responsible is none other than the West, which uses the principles of democracy and freedom “to defend its totalitarian values.” For this reason, in his address, he accused Westerners of “distorting historical facts, and attacking our culture and the Orthodox Church.” Thus, the objective of the West, according to Putin, is to repeat in the “Russian world” what it is doing with their respective peoples: to destroy the family and cultural and national identity of the region.
Putin consequently developed an ideological message that has lead him to not give up in Ukraine, to prolong the conflict, beyond any provisional armistice, in a war of attrition, because he is convinced that time will play in his favor and the Western governments, spurred on by their public opinions and electoral appointments, will be forced to reduce their military and economic support for Ukraine, which would play in Russia’s favor. In addition, the Russian president seems to implicitly play the card that he and he alone is the only guarantee for an end to the hostilities, no matter how precarious he may in fact be. In fact, the idea has spread in some Western foreign ministries that a successor to Putin, if he loses power or his life, would be a much more radical nationalist. Raising these fears can prove much more effective than the usual mantra of using tactical nuclear weapons.